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Chapter 9. Greeted with a Shrug: The Impact of the Community Design
System on United States Law

Stacey Dogan*
I. Introduction
In an era of increased harmonization of intellectual property laws worldwide, the
United States’ treatment of product design looks like an anomaly. Since the European
Community Design System went into effect in 2002, advocates in the US have urged
Congress to follow suit and adopt sui generis design protection, particularly for
fashion.1 The US Congress, however, has resisted the call and left design protection to
the existing standards of trademark, copyright and design patent law.2
The legislature’s recalcitrance on design is not entirely a byproduct of current
Congressional dysfunction.3 Other, more productive Congresses have considered and
rejected design protection in the past, most notably in connection with the 1976
overhaul of the Copyright Act.4 Then as now, the rejection of design rights arose from
a confluence of factors, some substantive and some more pragmatic. The substantive
concerns include the utilitarian tradition of US intellectual property law, with its
ostensible preference for competition over exclusivity; this model eschews new forms of
exclusive rights, except when necessary to incentivize creators and avoid market
*
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E.g., T. Mahmood, Note: Design Law in the United States as Compared to the European Community
Design System: What Do We Need to Fix? [2014] 24 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media and Ent. L.J. 555; C.
S. Hemphill and J. Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion [2009] 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1147; See
generally Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. [2009]; Design Piracy Prohibition Act,
S. 1957, 110th Cong. [2007]; Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. [2006].
2 See generally M. A. Lemley and M. P. McKenna, Scope [2016] 57 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 2197; M. P.
McKenna and C.J. Sprigman, What’s In, and What’s Out: How IP’s Boundary Rules Shape Innovation
[2017] 30 Harv. J.L. and Tech. 491.
3 M. Ellement, The Supreme Court Meets a Gridlocked Congress [2016] 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo
116, 166 (noting that Congress is currently “at a standstill- increasingly unable to agree on, or even
debate, new legislation”); J. Steinhauer and D. M. Herszenhorn, ‘Congress Recesses, Leaving More
Stalemates Than Accomplishments’ (N.Y. Times 14 July 2016)
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/us/politics/congress-recesses-leaving-more-stalemates-thanaccomplishments.html> accessed 24 November 2017.
4 See An Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Title 17 of the United States Code, and for
Other Purposes S. 22, 94th Cong. [1975]; S. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong. [1975]; cf. H.R. Rep. No. 941476 [1976]; see generally J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976 [1983] Duke L.J. 1143, 1188-90; R. S.
Brown, Jr., Design Protection: An Overview [1987] 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1396 (“Beginning in 1957, a
[design] bill has been introduced in probably every Congress, in a form closely resembling the current
model.”).
1
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failure.5 This commitment to core principles, of course, tells only part of the story,
since Congress adheres to it selectively; some new rights have emerged despite little
evidence that they will meaningfully affect incentives or serve other utilitarian goals.6
Nonetheless, the utilitarian foundations of US intellectual property law help to situate
the country’s approach to design protection, in comparison to jurisdictions with
different philosophical traditions. In particular, because US law aims to promote
progress rather than to reward individual creators, lawmakers may resist arguments
that prevail in jurisdictions with a stronger emphasis on rewards or moral rights.7
While a commitment to utilitarianism explains some of the US resistance to sui
generis design rights, other factors have played an important role. Definitional
problems that have long plagued design litigation do not disappear when protection
shifts from existing IP rights into some new legal form. Nor does sui generis protection
solve enforcement, overlap, or patent-deference concerns. Political economy
considerations that have supported expansions of other IP rights play out differently
in the product design context. Perhaps most importantly, US design patent law has
evolved into a viable form of protection for many types of design.8 Together, these
factors have prevented the US from following Europe’s lead in adopting a regime like
the Community Design System.
The absence of sui generis design protection does not, however, mean an absence of
legal protection for design. Despite its practical and theoretical hurdles, there is broad
intuitive appeal to the notion that creative designers deserve some form of protection
against copying. At times, this has led courts to find outlets for design protection
under copyright and trademark/unfair competition law. Throughout the twentieth and
early twenty-first century, these areas of law expanded and contracted in response to
perceived gaps or gluts in protection for design.9 Design patent law, moreover, which
See Graham v. John Deere Co. [1966] 383 U.S. 1, 5-11 (“The inherent problem [in devising a patent
system] was to develop some means of weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or
devised but for the inducement of a patent.”); see generally W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, The
Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Belknap Press 2003) (“Skeptics of government should
hesitate to extend a presumption of efficiency to a process by which government grants rights to exclude
competition with the holders of the rights.”); P. S. Menell and S. Scotchmer, ‘Intellectual Property’ in: A.
Mitchell Polinksy and S. Shavell (eds.) Handbook of Law and Economics (Elsevier 2007); see also Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson [1813] (on file with Library of Congress).
6 See, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 [1996] (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. para 1125(c)); cf. R. Tushnet, ‘Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science’ [2008] 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507, 510 (“Dilution is, ultimately, an underevidenced concept
and one that invites socially wasteful litigation.”); see also Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 [1998]; cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft [2004] 537 U.S. 186, 222
(upholding copyright term extension despite scant evidence of any effect on incentives: “The wisdom of
Congress’ action … is not within our province to second-guess”).
7 See generally R. J. DaSilva, ‘Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights
in France and the United States’ [1980] 28 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 1; L. Zemer, ‘Moral Rights: Limited
Edition’ [2011] 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1519.
8 See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd. [2015] 786 F.3d 983, 1001-02; see also Sarah Burstein,
‘Costly Designs’ [2016] 77 Ohio St. L.J. 107, 109-11.
9 Compare, e.g., Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana Inc. [1992] 505 U.S. 763 (“Denying protection for
inherently distinctive nonfunctional trade dress until after secondary meaning has been established
5
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saw little action through the twentieth century,10 has recently emerged as a popular
form of protection for certain types of design. Thus, in varying ways at different times,
US law has recognized some forms of legal rights for designers. But the shifting sands,
continuing uncertainty, and enduring gaps for short-term designs such as fashion
have fueled the ongoing push for sui generis protection. Advocates have pointed to the
Community Design System in support of their appeal, but to date, their calls have
gone unanswered.
This Chapter explores some of the reasons that the Community Design System has
had so little purchase in US debates over design. It begins in Part I with an overview
of US law’s treatment of design, including the gaps and other features that have
fueled calls for legislative reform. Part II then turns to the recent history of design
legislation in the US, including the role of the Community Design System in
Congressional testimony and deliberations. That history demonstrates that, despite
repeated pleas to follow the global trend on design, Congress has so far resisted, for
both philosophical and practical reasons. Part III closes with some reflections on
whether the US will ever move beyond the current impasse on design.
1. Design Protection in the US
The US’s ambivalence about new forms of design protection comes from the confluence
of three factors: the utilitarian focus of US intellectual property law, a general
suspicion of monopoly and preference for competition, and the hybrid nature of design.
The first two points are interrelated: with free, competitive markets as the
presumptive baseline, intellectual property rights are justified only because they
either enable fair competition (trademarks), or provide necessary incentives to induce
authorship or invention (copyrights and patents). Absent one of these justifications,
the law presumes that market forces will bring the best results for consumers and
society. While notions of reward and dessert undoubtedly inform intuitions about
intellectual property rights,11 they find no basis in the Constitution, from which
Congress receives its lawmaking authority.12
would allow a competitor, which has not adopted a distinctive trade dress of its own, to appropriate the
originator’s dress in other markets and to deter the originator from expanding into and competing in
these areas.”), with Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros Inc. [2000] 529 U.S. 205, 214 (rejecting
possibility of “inherently distinctive” product design trade dress: “Competition is deterred, however, not
merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of
inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged inherent
distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.”); see generally J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and
the Legislative Agenda [1992] 55 Law and Contemp. Problems 281, 287 (describing a cycle in which
“chronic underprotection in industrial property law leads to chronic overprotection in artistic property
law, which in turn inspires further reactive reforms of industrial property law tending to reinstate
levels of underprotection that will foster renewed appeals to copyright law”).
10 See, e.g., Brown, Design Protection, supra note 4 at 1355-57.
11 See, e.g., W. J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property [1993] 102 Yale L.J. 1540; S. L. Dogan, ‘Harms, Benefits, and
Justifications in Trademark Law’ [2017] (unpublished working draft) (on file with author).
12 The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides the basis for patent and copyright
law, while the Commerce Clause enables trademark and other unfair competition laws. See U.S. Const.
Art. 1, para 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by

But why, given the role of incentives in US intellectual property law, has Congress
resisted the call for additional incentives for design?13 It’s here that the hybrid nature
of design comes into play. Historically, as suggested by the Constitution, US law
developed two separate tracks for protection of creative expression and functional
innovation. These tracks – copyright and utility patent law – evolved not only to fit
their unique subject matter, but also to steer clear of one another’s domain. From
subject matter to eligibility requirements to infringement to defenses, courts and
Congress crafted rules to fit the perceived needs of these distinct types of human
creations.
Patent law, for example, gives strong legal rights,14 but for a short(er) duration,15 and
only to inventors who contribute new, non-obvious advances in some useful process or
product.16 It aims to provide relatively prompt access to functional innovations, so that
subsequent innovators have a broad set of building blocks from which to draw.17 The
more fundamental building blocks – laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas – lie beyond even patent law’s reach; the law declares them “part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men … free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.”18 Patent law, then, provides muscular rights, but only for eligible inventions
and for limited times. All other useful innovations – inventions with expired patents,
works that fail patent law’s substantive standards, and discoveries of laws of nature,
physical phenomena, or abstract ideas – fall into patent’s public domain. That public
domain, moreover, is guarded to protect against propertization of these interests in
some other name.19 Patent, in other words, has a strong interest in ensuring free
access to the raw materials necessary for useful innovation.
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries”); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City [1966] 383 U.S. 1, 9 (noting Thomas Jefferson’s
rejection of natural rights in favor of a “social and economic rationale of the patent system” that viewed
patents as “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge”); see also In re Trade-Mark Cases
[1879] 100 U.S. 82, 89 (noting Congressional power to regulate the “fraudulent dealing in trade-marks”
which “plainly interferes with and thwarts the power and duty of the United States to protect foreign
and interstate trade”).
13 See generally J.H. Reichman, supra note 9 at 283 (“Recent studies suggest that industrial design, like
computer programs and other forms of applied scientific know-how, cannot yield long-term rewards to
innovators if the short-term profits from successful innovation are consistently appropriated by freeriders who do not share the costs and risks of the creative process.”).
14 35 U.S.C. para 271.
15 Id. at para 154.
16 Id. at paras 101-103.
17 See, e.g., Graham, supra note 85 at 7-9; cf. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade Inc. [1992] 977 F.2d
1510, 1526 (“In order to enjoy a lawful monopoly over the idea of functional principle underlying a work,
the creator of the work must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the patent laws.”);
Specialized Seating Inc. v. Greenwich Indus LP [2010] 616 F.3d 722, 727 (noting goal of trademark’s
functionality doctrine “to separate the spheres of patent and trademark law, and to ensure that the
term of a patent is not extended beyond the period authorized by the legislature”).
18 Funk Bros Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co. [1948] 333 U.S. 127, 130.
19 Cf. J. E. Cohen, ‘Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain’, in L.
Guibault and P.B. Hugenholtz (eds.) The Future of the Public Domain (Kluwer Law International 2006),
121-166 (exploring historical and theoretical perspectives on the “public domain” in intellectual

Copyright strikes its balance differently, both for its own intrinsic reasons and out of
deference to patent law concerns. It has a long term,20 but flimsier rights;21 it allows
numerous exceptions;22 and it limits itself to the expressive form, rather than the
style, idea, or philosophy underlying an author’s work.23 All of these features help to
balance copyright’s short-term goal of incentivizing authorship with its ultimate
objective of enabling discourse and advancing knowledge.24 But copyright also
explicitly defers to patent law’s separate concerns, by excluding “any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery” from protection,
“regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied” in
an original work.25 Copyright, in other words, avoids giving rights in anything that
patent law cares about. It disavows protection of features that “have their final end in
application and use.”26 Authors cannot use copyright to claim rights over patenteligible innovations; nor may they claim elements that patent law has purposely
dedicated to the public. Features that have value because they work, in other words,
tend to fall outside the scope of copyright.27
This division between the expressive and the functional makes sense as a matter of
principle and provides a workable standard in many contexts. A chemist who writes a
book disclosing a new chemical compound may claim copyright in the book, but must
look to patent law for rights in the compound itself.28 Useful articles that contain some

property law). Creations in patent’s public domain may receive trade secret or other forms of contingent
legal protection, but they may not obtain government-granted exclusive rights. See Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp. [1974] 416 U.S. 470 (holding that patent law does not preempt state trade secret
protection).
20 17 U.S.C. para 302.
21 While patent gives the exclusive right to make, use, sell, or import the invention within the statutory
term, copyright protects only against copying or other uses that derive directly from the copyright
holder’s work. It does not protect against the independent creation of similar expression. Id. at para106.
22 See id. at paras 107-122.
23 Of course, drawing the line between these concepts proves difficult, as Judge Hand observed in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. [1930] 45 F.2d 119, 121 (discussing boundary between idea and
expression: “Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”).
24 See U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8; see also Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios Inc. [1984]
464 U.S. 417, 429 (noting copyright law’s goal of achieving “a difficult balance between the interests of
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand,
and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other
hand”).
25 17 U.S.C. para 102(b).
26 Baker v. Selden [1879] 101 U.S. 99, 104; cf. Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands Inc. [2017] 137 S.
Ct. 1002, 1006 (although useful features in themselves cannot claim copyright, “[a]n artistic feature
that would be eligible for copyright protection on its own cannot lose that protection simply because it
was first created as a feature of the design of a useful article, even if it makes that article more useful”).
27 See Computer Associates Intern. Inc. v. Altai Inc. [1992] 982 F.2d 693, 715 (upholding district court’s
decision that a feature of a program’s structure was “dictated by the nature of other programs with
which it was designed to interact and, thus, is not protected by copyright”); but see Oracle Amer. Inc. v.
Google Inc. [2014] 750 F.3d 1339, 1359-72 (upholding copyright in application program interfaces,
despite their function in enabling communications between layers in a computer system).
28 See generally Baker, supra note 25 at 104.

purely aesthetic feature – say, the pattern on a sofa’s fabric,29 or a statuette that
serves as a lamp base but adds nothing to the utility of the lamp30 – may receive
copyright protection for those features.31 In each of these situations, the work contains
certain features that contribute to its utility, and others that are purely expressive.
The useful features (the chemical compound, the shape and feel of the couch, and the
mechanics and illuminating features of the light) fall into patent law’s domain, and
beyond the reach of copyright. The expressive features, in contrast (the text of the
chemistry book, the pattern of the fabric, and the shape and colors of the statuette)
may qualify under copyright, but not patent. This divide is neither accidental nor
compromising: it reflects a recognition that copyright and patent rights have evolved
specifically to fit their subject matter, and a belief that any mismatch between right
and subject matter could come with significant social costs. 32
The problem with design, of course, is that it straddles the patent/copyright divide. In
its most general sense, design reflects the “purpose or planning that exists behind an
action, fact, or object.”33 While at some points in history “art” was viewed as
“something to be applied as an accessory to a design,”34 today “we see the beauty of an
artifact – its ‘art’ … - as an integral part of its design.”35 That art, moreover, often
pervades the design in a way that makes it hard to extricate aesthetics from function,
as traditional patent and copyright law demand. Indeed, research has shown that even
when they might appear separable, aesthetics and function may have a synergistic
relationship because “people perceive more-aesthetic designs as easier to use than
less-aesthetic designs – whether they are or not.”36 As a result, granting copyright in
the aesthetic aspects of many designs risks giving rights over their functional aspects
as well, which would violate the mandate that copyright stay out of patent’s territory.
It would also defy the normative principle behind that rule: that the public deserves

See, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp. [1977] 558 F.2d 1090.
See Mazer v. Stein [1954] 347 U.S. 201.
31 The Copyright Act provides that the design of a “useful article” – one that has “an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the article or to convey information” – may be protected “if, and
only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.” 17 U.S.C. para 101.
32 See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian [1971] 446 F.2d 738, 741 (“Obviously a
copyright must not be treated as equivalent to a patent lest long continuing private monopolies be
conferred over areas of gainful activity without first satisfying the substantive and procedural
prerequisites to the grant of such privileges.”).
33 Design, Oxford English Dictionary Online, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/design>
accessed 26 September 2017.
34 C. Fiell and P. Fiell, The Story of Design: From the Paleolithic to the Present (The Monacelli Press
2016).
35 Id.; see also Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands Inc. [2017] 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1034 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“great industrial design may well include design that is inseparable from the useful article
– where, as Frank Lloyd Wright put it, ‘form and function are one’”) (quoting F. Wright, Frank Lloyd
Wright: An Autobiography 146 (reprint 2005) [1943]); M. P. McKenna and K. J. Strandburg, ‘Progress
and Competition in Design’ [2013] 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1.
36 See W. Lidwell et al., Universal Principles of Design (Rockport Publishers 2003) (describing this
phenomenon as the “aesthetic-usability effect”).
29
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broad and prompt access to the building blocks of functional innovation.37 Denying
protection, on the other hand, deprives designers of copyright’s rewards (and
incentives) for their original expression.
This tension – between the desire to incentivize original expression and caution about
tying up functional tools – has plagued copyright since Congress first extended
protection to works of applied art in 1909.38 The current Copyright Act allows
protection of expressive features of functional objects so long as those “features … can
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article.”39 This “separability” doctrine has perplexed the
courts, who have struggled with what it means for a feature to be separately
“identifi[able]” despite its physical embodiment in a useful object.40 Star Athletica v.
Varsity Brands, the Supreme Court’s recent foray into separability, did little to clarify
things; in upholding the copyright on the surface decorations on cheerleading
uniforms, the Court left unanswered questions about how it would handle threedimensional objects whose function is inextricably melded with their form. On its face,
the Court’s standard for separability appears broad enough to include virtually any
visually appealing object: “a feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for
copyright if, when identified and imagined apart from the useful article, it would
qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or when fixed in
some other tangible medium.”41 Yet the Court makes clear that its rule would not
allow copyright in either the “shape, cut, and physical dimensions of the cheerleading
uniforms,”42 or in “a shovel as a shovel.”43 Star Athletica thus fails to resolve the
ongoing uncertainty about copyright protection for three-dimensional design. Because
See generally Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Intern. Inc. [1995] 49 F.3d 807, 819 (J. Boudin,
concurring) (“It is no accident that patent protection has preconditions that copyright protection does
not – notably, the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness – and that patents are granted for a
shorter period than copyrights.”); cf. Jay Franco and Sons Inc. v. Franek [2010] 615 F.3d 855, 859. The
implications for patent-eligible and non-patent eligible features are related but distinct. For patenteligible features, denying copyright protection drives the inventor to the form of protection better
calibrated for functional inventions, with its disclosure requirements and relatively short term. For nonpatent-eligible useful features, denying copyright protection wards against an end-run of patent
requirements, which could ironically lock up non-inventive building blocks for a time far exceeding the
patent term. See Baker v. Selden [1879] 101 U.S. 99, 102 (noting concerns over the use of copyright law
to circumvent patent law’s substantive standards, short term, and disclosure requirements).
38 See Mazer v. Stein [1954] 347 U.S. 201, 208-14.
39 17 U.S.C. para 101.
40 See generally Star Athletica, supra note 35 at 1018 and n. 1 (J. Ginsburg, concurring) (“Courts ‘have
struggled mightily to formulate a test’ for the separability analysis”) (quoting Star Athletica L.L.C. v.
Varsity Brands Inc. [2015] 799 F.3d 468, 484); see also Mazer v. Stein [1954] 347 U.S. 201.
41 Star Athletica, supra note 35 at 1012 (emphasis added) and 1014 (“An artistic feature that would be
eligible for copyright protection on its own cannot lose that protection simply because it was first
created as a feature of the design of a useful article, even if it makes that article more useful.”).
42 Id. at 1016 (“our test does not render the shape, cut, and physical dimensions of the cheerleading
uniforms eligible for copyright protection,” presumably because they fail the separability test).
43 Id. at 1013 and n.2 (noting that if a “shovel included any artistic features that could be perceived as
art apart from the shovel, and which would qualify as protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works
on their own or in another medium, they too could be copyrighted but a shovel as a shovel cannot”)
(emphasis added).
37

the case involves only surface ornamentation, the opinion avoids the fundamental
question of how to protect expression while respecting patent law’s commitment to its
public domain.
While the ongoing struggle over the domains of patent and copyright does not speak
directly to the merits of sui generis design protection, it offers some hints about the
challenges confronting design legislation in the United States. Generally, it
demonstrates a longstanding assumption in US law that the “functional” and the
“expressive” lend themselves to different forms of legal protection that are calibrated
to their needs. More specifically, it reflects a discomfort with exclusive rights in useful
features, except when they have undergone the rigors of patent examination. When
combined with the general presumption in favor of access and competitive markets,
these factors provide a powerful force for the status quo and against new rights.
These same factors have shaped the development of trademark protection for product
design. US trademark law protects product features, such as shape and color, whose
consistent usage over time has led consumers to associate them with a single source.44
Unlike patent and copyright law, however, US trademark law does not view
incentivizing such features as its raison d’être.45 The law does not aim to encourage
investment in appealing marks, nor does it treat marks as having any intrinsic social
value apart from their informational function.46 Instead, US trademark law views
marks as informational devices, and protects them to guard against misinformation in
markets, with the ultimate goal of making markets more competitive.47 It’s not that
trademark law has nothing to do with incentives or rewards, but the incentives and
rewards of trademark focus on the trademark holder’s investment in its reputation,
rather than investment in the creation of a work (i.e., a trademark) that itself
functions or entertains.48 The law does not – at least deliberately – seek to incentivize
the creation of marks based on their aesthetic appeal, function, or other inherent
value. It seeks to enable informed and competitive markets.
Given trademark law’s focus on competition, it shares (and amplifies) copyright’s
skepticism about locking up features that enhance product function. In trademark
law, this skepticism plays out through the functionality doctrine, which bars
See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc. [2000] 529 U.S. 205, 212-16.
See, e.g., TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc. [2001] 532 U.S. 23, 34 (“The Lanham Act
does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the
purpose of the patent law and its [limited] period of exclusivity.”).
46 The law acknowledges that trademarks (particularly trade dress) often make the product more
attractive; that alone does not justify denial of trademark protection. “The chief difficulty is
distinguishing between designs that are fashionable enough to be functional and those that are merely
pleasing.” Jay Franco and Sons Inc. v. Franek [2010] 615 F.3d 855, 860.
47 See S. L. Dogan and M. A. Lemley, ‘The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?’
[2005] 54 Emory L.J. 461 at 467 (“Trademark law … aims to promote more competitive markets by
improving the quality of information in those markets.”).
48 Id. at 468 (“Trademark law quite deliberately does not serve” incentive-related goals; “both its
philosophy and its structure reject the notion that trademark rights should serve as either an
inducement or a reward for the creation of product features that have inherent – as opposed to sourceidentifying – value.”).
44
45

trademark protection for any feature that is “essential to the use or purpose of [a]
device” or “affects the cost or quality of the device.”49
For a time in the late twentieth century, some courts interpreted functionality
narrowly, using it to deny protection only for features that had no effective
substitutes. Thus, features that contributed to a product’s function or ease of use could
be protected, as long as the trademark holder could point to alternative ways to
accomplish that function in competitors’ products.50 This “competitive necessity”
approach viewed the purpose of functionality as enabling competitive markets; as long
as a particular feature was not essential to competition, the reasoning went, it made
sense to protect it if it played any signaling role to consumers.51
In TrafFix v. Marketing Displays,52 however, the Supreme Court rejected the
competition-focused view of functionality in favor of one that blended competition
concerns with patent-deference considerations. The plaintiff in TrafFix had sought
trade dress protection for a road sign’s “dual spring device,” which enabled the sign to
sway in the wind without falling over. The court of appeals had found the spring
device non-functional, because competitors had viable alternatives, including the
option of using the same spring and covering it up.53 The Supreme Court reversed, in
an opinion that rejected the competitive necessity test as a “comprehensive definition”
of functionality.54 While endorsing competitive necessity in cases involving aesthetic
product features,55 the Court found it inapt for features that are “essential to the use
or purpose” of a product or “affect[ its] cost or quality.”56 For such features, it is
irrelevant whether alternatives exist; the feature cannot serve as a trademark.57 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the same normative principle that
drives the patent/copyright divide: the notion that patent law – and not copyright or
trademark – is the sole arbiter of exclusive rights in functional innovation.58

TrafFix, supra note 45 at 33.
See, e.g., Marketing Displays Inc. v. TrafFix Devices Inc. [1999] 200 F.3d 929, 940 (holding that a
dual-spring mechanism at the base of a road sign could receive trademark protection, because
competitors could use the same springs but cover them to make the feature not visible to consumers).
51 See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods. Inc. [1982] 671 F.2d 1332, 1337 (“when a design is ‘nonfunctional,’ the right to compete through imitation gives way, presumably upon balance of that right
with the originator’s right to prevent others from infringing upon an established system of trade
identification”).
52 TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc. [2001] 532 U.S. 23.
53 Marketing Displays, 200 F.3d at 940.
54 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.
55 See id. at 32-33 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. [1995] 514 U.S. 159, 165).
56 Id. at 33.
57 See id. (aesthetic functionality (and the availability of alternatives) applies only when the feature has
no “bearing on the use or purpose of the product or its cost or quality”).
58 Id. at 34 (“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a
particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity. … Whether there is
a utility patent or there has been no utility patent at all, a product design which has a particular
appearance may be functional because it is ‘essential to the use or purpose of the article’ or ‘affects the
cost or quality of the article.’”); see also McKenna and Strandburg, supra note 35 at 23 (“Because
‘unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions’ provide ‘the baseline of free competition’ that produces
49
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For the most part, post-TrafFix courts have taken the Supreme Court at its word and
rejected trade dress claims to elements that contribute to a product’s function,
distinguishing between such features (which are always functional) and “arbitrary,
incidental, or ornamental aspects of features” (which may be functional under
aesthetic functionality’s competition-focused standard).59 Unless a trademark claimant
can point to a “feature that contributes no demonstrable benefit to the operation or
efficiency of the designed product,”60 it will likely fail the TrafFix functionality test. As
a result, like copyright, trademark law offers few options for designs whose aesthetic
appeal blends inextricably with function.
With copyright protection unclear and trademark protection unattainable for many
valuable design features, a third option – design patent – has recently emerged as a
viable alternative for many types of design. US design patent law allows protection for
“any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”61 Design
patents last for fifteen years from the date of grant.62 The process of obtaining a design
patent resembles that of utility patents: the applicant submits an application with the
Patent and Trademark Office, which subjects it to a substantive review. Like utility
patents, design patents require novelty63 and non-obviousness64 of the design. Unlike
utility patents, however, design patents cover only “ornamental” features of
products.65 Design patents thus cover completely different features than utility
patents. “While utility patents protect ‘the way an article is used and works,’ design
patents protect ‘the way an article looks.’”66 Of course, it’s no easy task to distinguish
between the two; as discussed below, design patent’s own functionality doctrine
attempts to mediate between form and function. In contrast to copyright and
the ‘ordinary innovation’ upon which the patent incentive builds, trade dress law subordinates its static
competition goals to patent law’s dynamic goals.”) (internal quotations omitted).
59 See, e.g., Groeneveld Transport Efficiency Inc. v. Lubecore International Inc. [2013] 730 F.3d 494, 505
(affirming lower court’s finding of functionality when “all the elements of [the claimed] pump are there
for some practical benefit or reason,” and when trademark claimant had not presented evidence of a
“purely ornamental feature that contributes no demonstrable benefit to the operation or efficiency of the
designed product”) (internal quotations omitted); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent
America Holdings Inc. [2012] 696 F.3d 206, 219-20 (“when the aesthetic design of a product is itself the
mark for which protection is sought, we may also deem the mark functional if giving the markholder
the right to use it exclusively ‘would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage’”) (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
60 Groeneveld, id. at 505.
61 35 U.S.C. para 171. Design patents must also satisfy the general requirements for utility patents,
including non-obviousness, novelty, and disclosure. Id.
62 Id. at para 173. For applications filed before May 13, 2015, the term was fourteen years from the date
of grant.
63 Id. at para102.
64 Id. at para103.
65 Id. at para171(a). Patented designs must also be “original,” but the originality requirement is rarely
at issue. See generally Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp.[2009] 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 (“The
purpose of incorporating an originality requirement is unclear; it likely was designed to incorporate the
copyright concept of originality—requiring that the work be original with the author…”).
66 Burstein, supra note 8 at 112 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Off., Manual
of Patent Examining Procedure para 1502.01 [9th ed., Rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015]).

trademark law, however, design patent offers a form of protection that is arguably
better suited to aesthetically appealing industrial design, because it expires after a
relatively short duration.
For most of the twentieth century, design patents saw little action because of their
reputation as expensive, cumbersome, substantively demanding, and narrowly
construed.67 Since the turn of the century, however, design patents have enjoyed a
renaissance, with soaring application numbers and high profile infringement suits.68
Although many factors have contributed to this shift, three developments proved
critical: trademark law’s retreat from broad design protection,69 a softening of the
rigorous standards for obtaining a design patent,70 and a Federal Circuit decision that
eased the burden of proving design patent infringement.71 Together, these changes
have led to an explosion in design patent acquisition and litigation.

See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 13 at 286 (“the design patent law still requires a full examination of
the prior art, which makes it too costly, slow and cumbersome for the bulk of the commercial designs
competing in today’s fast-paced consumer markets”); Brown, supra note 4 at 1356 (describing design
patent as “a Cinderella who never goes to the ball,” and listing a number of “reasons why design patents
are held in low esteem”); P. J. Saidman, ‘The Crisis in the Law of Designs’ [2007] 89 J. Pat. and
Trademark Off. Soc’y 301; see also Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 8 at 109-11.
68 See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963-2015, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart,
<https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm> accessed 28 September 2017 (showing
increase from 18,292 design patent applications in 2000 to 39,097 in 2015); see also Samsung
Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc. [2016] 137 S. Ct. 429, 433-34 (describing history of litigation between Apple
and Samsung over iPhone design patents); Crocs v. ITC [2010] 598 F.3d 1294; see generally P. Lee and
M. Sunder, ‘Design Patents: Law Without Design’, [2013] 17 Stanford Tech. L. Rev. 277, 278-79.
69 The retreat occurred in two steps. The Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v.
Samara Bros. Inc. [2000] 529 U.S. 205, limited product-design trade dress protection to features that
have acquired secondary meaning among consumers. Four years later, the Court decided TrafFix, with
its aggressive approach to functionality. See supra notes 52-58. Together, these decisions substantially
narrowed the universe of product features that could qualify for trade dress protection.
70 See generally Burstein, supra note 8 at 139-141 (“The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which has had exclusive appellate jurisdiction in design patent cases since 1982, has quietly eroded the
statutory requirements for design patentability to the point where it is extremely difficult for the PTO
to reject design patent applications on the merits.”); S. Burstein, ‘Moving Beyond the Standard
Criticisms of Design Patents’ [2013] 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 305 at 324-28.
71 Egyptian Goddess Inc. v. Swisa Inc. [2008] 543 F.3d 665 (en banc). In Egyptian Goddess, the appeals
court abandoned the “point of novelty” requirement for design patent infringement, thus allowing a
showing of infringement based on the overall appearance of two designs. Id. at 670 (“[I]f, in the eyes of
an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially
the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”).
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While its rise is still nascent, under-theorized,72 and largely untested,73 design patent
may have the staying power that copyright and trademark lack for protection of
product design. For one thing, unlike these other forms of intellectual property, design
patent has a relatively short term,74 which reduces (but does not eliminate) the overall
social costs of granting rights in product features. It has an examination process and
qualitative standards that at least theoretically weed out non-novel or obvious
variations on existing art.75 Its disclosure requirement provides notice of the existence
and scope of design patent claims.76 And design patent has a functionality standard
that, like copyright and trademark’s versions, shows some deference to utility patent
as the exclusive domain for useful innovation. Design patent’s functionality doctrine is
somewhat narrower than trademark’s, excluding only those features that are “dictated
by function.”77 The Federal Circuit, moreover, has repeatedly upheld “narrow” design
patents that consist of purportedly ornamental combinations of functional elements.78
Design patent law thus allows claims that trademark and copyright would likely
eschew.79 Even so, the combination of moderate utility patent deference with limited
terms suggests that design patents are better calibrated than either trademark or
copyright law to protect the overall ornamental appearance of designs that blend form
with function.
This is changing fast; numerous scholars have turned their attention to design patents in the past
decade. See, e.g., J. J. DuMont and M. D. Janis, ‘The Origins of American Design Patent Protection’
[2013], 88 Ind. L.J. 837; S. Burstein, ‘The Patented Design’ [2015] 83 Tenn. L. Rev. 161; S. Burstein,
‘Visual Invention’ [2012] 16 Lewis and Clark L. Rev. 169, 175; J. M. Mueller and D. Harris Brean,
‘Overcoming the “Impossible Issue” of Nonobviousness in Design Patents’ [2011] 99 Ky. L.J. 419; and
the articles published in Volume 17 of the Stanford Technology Law Review [2013]
<https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-lawreview/online/vol17issue1_0.pdf> accessed 24 November 2017.
73 Although the Federal Circuit has issued plenty of design patent opinions in recent years, the
Supreme Court has not decided a substantive design patent case since the 1800s. See Smith v. Whitman
Saddle Co. [1893] 148 U.S. 674. Its only recent design patent opinion involved damages, and the Court
reversed the Federal Circuit’s plaintiff-friendly interpretation of the damages provision in the design
patent law. See Samsung v. Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429.
74 35 U.S.C. para 173 (providing for term of fifteen years from date of grant).
75 Id. at paras 171, 102, 103.
76 Cf. J. Bessen and M. J. Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton University Press 2009) (“Property can fail
when boundary information is not publicly accessible,” and “when the boundaries of the rights are not
clear and predictable.”).
77 See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. v. Covidien Inc. [2015] 796 F.3d 1312, 1334.
78 See, e.g., id. at 1334 (“Thus, although the Design Patents do not protect the general design concept of
an open trigger, torque knob, and activation button in a particular configuration, they nevertheless
have some scope – the particular ornamental designs of those underlying elements.”); Sport Dimension
Inc. v. Coleman Co. Inc. [2016] 820 F.3d 1316, 1323 (agreeing with district court that the armbands and
side torso tapering of life jackets were functional, but nonetheless concluding that the court should have
included these features in evaluating infringement: “the armbands and side torso tapering serve a
functional purpose, so the fact finder should not focus on the particular designs of these elements when
determining infringement, but rather focus on what these elements contribute to the design’s overall
ornamentation”).
79 It remains to be seen whether Star Athletica will apply broadly to three-dimensional features of
industrial designs; if it does, it may result in significant overlap between copyright and design patent,
because the Supreme Court’s emphasis on whether a feature could be “imagined” apart from the useful
article comes close to the Federal Circuit’s inquiry into the “overall ornamentation” reflected in an
industrial design. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012; see also Sport Dimension, 820 F.3d at 1316.
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Better calibrated, of course, does not mean perfect, and as design patents have surged
in popularity, critics have warned that their proliferation may cause thickets and
other anticompetitive effects.80 These effects multiply when courts allow design
patent-holders to leverage their periods of exclusivity into potentially perpetual trade
dress rights.81 These concerns suggest that courts should shape design patent law with
caution; in particular, they should incorporate rigor into design patent standards, and
reconsider the wisdom of allowing trademark protection for previously patented
designs.82 But at least compared to trademark and copyright, design patent is better
tailored to its subject matter; and as Sarah Burstein has argued, the expense and
effort associated with design patents may well weed out some trivial innovations and
reduce the risk of thickets.83 In any event, in the long arc of US intellectual property
history, the renewed interest in design patents has relieved some of the pressure
toward new forms of protection for design.
Design patent’s newfound popularity, however, has not entirely quelled the call for sui
generis design rights, particularly in the area of fashion. Critics contend that, even if
design patents provide adequate protection for some types of design, they do not meet
the needs of fast-moving industries like fashion.84 Design patents take an average of
over nineteen months to issue – an eternity for an industry that introduces new
designs every season.85 And prosecuting a design patent requires a significant
financial investment.86 As a result, while large fashion houses have turned to design
patents to protect “staple items” such as shoes and purses,87 smaller, more garmentSee, e.g., Burstein, supra note 8 at 129-132 (describing social costs associated with bad design
patents); Lee and Sunder, supra note 68 at 290-293.
81 Because design patent owners have a guaranteed period of exclusivity in the sale of products bearing
their design, they can often demonstrate that the design has acquired secondary meaning at the
expiration of the design patent term. See Burstein, supra note 80 at 131. And many courts have
(erroneously, in my view) held that a feature’s non-functionality under design patent law means that it
is non-functional as a matter of trademark law. See generally S. Burstein, ‘Commentary: Faux Amis in
Design Law’ [2015] 105 Trademark Rep. 1455, 1458-59 (criticizing this line of cases); see also M. P.
McKenna, ‘(Dys)functionality’ [2011] 48 Hous. L. Rev. 823, 843.
82 McKenna and Burstein have demonstrated the folly – and the costs – of the current approach. See
Burstein, supra note 81; McKenna, supra note 81.
83 Burstein, supra note 8.
84 See, e.g., Hemphill and Suk, supra note 1 at 1150 and n.10; S. Scafidi, ‘Intellectual Property and
Fashion Design’, in P. K. Yu (ed) Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Copyright and Related
Rights (Greenwood Publishing Group 2006) at 115.
85 See Data Visualization Center: Patents Dashboard: Design Traditional Total Pendency, U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, <https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1006>
accessed 28 September 2017.
86 Basic design patent filing fees come to $760 for large entities, $380 for small entities, and $190 for
micro-entities. See USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
<https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule> accessed 28
September 2017. Because most applicants also hire attorneys or patent agents to prepare design
drawings and to prosecute their applications, overall fees can run into thousands of dollars.
87 See The Fashion Law, ‘Currently Trending in Fashion: Design Patents’,
<http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/currently-trending-in-fashion-design-patents> accessed 24
November 2017.
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focused designers have less to gain from the design patent regime. And even wellheeled designers complain of design patent’s inadequacy in protecting against “fastfashion” copying, through which “thousands of inexpensive copies of a new design can
be produced, from start to finish, in six weeks or less.”88 These industry-specific
concerns provide both the engine and the backdrop for the perennial push for sui
generis fashion legislation.
II. US Design Legislation and the Role of the Community Design System
Over the past decade, the United States Congress has considered several different
iterations of design legislation, with a particular emphasis on fashion.89 While
specifics vary, all of the bills would extend some form of short-term protection to
original fashion designs.90 Early bills required prompt registration, and allowed for a
three-year term;91 more recent legislation would offer automatic protection for three
years after a design is made available to the public.92 Drafters have also tweaked the
standards for eligibility and infringement.93 Although the two most recent bills have
made it through the Senate Judiciary Committee and proceeded to the Senate floor,94
none has yet seen a vote by either the Senate or the House.
The witness testimony and lawmaker commentary about these bills offer insight into
why Congress has not (yet) followed Europe in adopting a new design law. It’s not for
lack of awareness of the Community Design System and similar laws around the
world. To the contrary, the global trend toward design protection plays a recurrent
role in the legislative debate.95 Instead, the record shows legislators intuitively drawn
Hemphill and Suk, supra note 1 at 1171.
See, e.g., A Bill to Amend Title 17, United States Code, to Provide Protection for Fashion Design, H.R.
5055, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Mar. 30, 2006) (“H.R. 5055”); Design Piracy Prohibition Act,
S.1957, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Aug. 2, 2007); Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033,
110th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced April 25, 2007); Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention
Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Aug. 5, 2010) (“IDPPPA”); Innovative Design Protection
Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Sept. 10, 2012) (“IDPA”).
90 Each of the Acts would amend the Copyright Act by broadening an existing sui generis provision
focused on vessel hulls. See H.R. 5055, supra note 89 at para1; see also 17 U.S.C. para 1301(a).
91 H.R. 5055, supra note 89 at para1 (c-e).
92 See IDPPA, supra note 89 at para 2(d, f).
93 Compare, e.g., H.R. 5055 (providing protection to any original “fashion design”), with IDPPPA para
2(a)(7](B) (limiting protection to designs that “provide a unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and nonutilitarian variation over prior designs for similar types of articles”).
94 See IDPPPA (placed on Senate legislative calendar Dec. 6, 2010); S. Rep. No. 112-259 [2012].
95 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 112-259 at 2 [2012] (“In terms of the protections available to designers, … the
United States remains at a disadvantage compared to the European Union, with which we compete to
be the global center of the fashion industry.”); Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet [2011] 112th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (“2011 Hearing”) (Statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (“Most industrialized nations
provide legal protection for fashion designs. However, in the United States, the world’s leader in
innovation and creativity, fashion designs are not protected by traditional intellectual property
regimes.”); Design Law – Are Special Provisions Needed to Protect Unique Industries?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property [2008] 110th Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (“2008
Hearing”) (Statement of William T. Fryer, III) (describing “design protection – protection when you go
88
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to the idea of protecting designers, but grappling with the fit between these fashion
bills and the normative goals of US intellectual property law. Equivocal economic
evidence, concerns about chill, and definitional questions that have long plagued
design protection have sowed doubt about the wisdom of the design bills; as a practical
matter, the relative modesty of the fashion industry’s political footprint no doubt
contributes to the inertia.
1. Equivocal economics.
Incentives. As discussed above, the US intellectual property tradition views
intellectual property rights through a utilitarian lens, which emphasizes social welfare
considerations over rewards to creators. As a result, although advocates of design
legislation routinely appeal to intuitive notions of fairness, their success depends on
their ability to persuade legislators that society – not just designers – will be better off
with design protection than without it. Incentives lie at the heart of their pitch:
without design protection, the argument goes, rip-offs will leave designers unable to
capture the full value of their work. The resulting underinvestment in design will
deter future designers from entering the field, leaving consumers worse off and
harming the national economy.
Not surprisingly, proponents of design legislation and their Congressional sponsors
have relied heavily on this incentives-based narrative. Representative Bob Goodlatte,
a sponsor of the 2011 Innovative Design and Piracy Protection Act, extolled the need
for fashion protection to provide the “incentive … necessary to maintain America’s
position as the world leader in innovation.”96 Witnesses warned that current fashion
copying “undermines incentives”97 and predicted that, “in the long term, lack of
protection will shrink American businesses and provoke the loss of American jobs.”98
Despite the visceral appeal of this incentives story, however, critics contend that it
relies on intuition and anecdote rather than hard economic data. Indeed, Christopher
Sprigman and Kal Raustiala have argued that knock-offs and other imitations benefit
the fashion industry by creating trends, which drive demand for fashion and thus

into the market, the entry-level protection” as “a trend across the world,” and mentioning Europe
specifically); id. at 19 (Statement of Rep. William D. Delahunt) (“Europe, Japan and India have
protection for 15–25 years for registered designs and we have nothing.”); id. at 22 (Statement of
Narcisco Rodriguez) (“Other developed countries such as Europe, Japan and India all provide 15 to 20
years of protection for fashion designs. Since there is no protection in the U.S., companies have emerged
with piracy as their business model.”).
96 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 1 (Statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte).
97 Id. at 15 (Statement of Jeannie Suk) (contending that “blatant replication … most directly takes
profits from the original producer and thus most undermines the incentive to create that federal
copyright law aims to foster”).
98 Id. at 8 (Statement of Lazaro Hernandez); see also id. at 9 (“Without this legislation, the creativity
and innovation that has put American fashion in a leadership position will dry up.”).

sustain a thriving market.99 As Sprigman testified before Congress, “For fashion,
copying does not deter innovation. It speeds it up.”100 Other scholars disagree. Scott
Hemphill and Jeannie Suk, for example, distinguish between imitation – which fosters
innovation and supports a vibrant fashion economy – and exact, fast-fashion copies –
which, they contend, drain revenues and dampen incentives for designers.101
Whatever the merits of these competing visions of the design industry, advocates of
design protection have to grapple with one uncomfortable truth: the industry has
flourished without the legal protection that they seek. Indeed, the industry’s own
witnesses celebrate the explosion of fashion design in the US.102 As designer Narcisco
Rodriguez testified in 2008, “More and more young Americans are going into fashion,
and America now leads the world in fashion design.”103 This does not, of course,
disprove the notion that designers lose money from copying, or that greater protection
might draw even more young Americans into the industry. But it does call into
question the premise upon which the industry’s utilitarian argument relies: that lack
of protection will result in market failure and underinvestment in fashion design.104
A similar disconnect appears in proponents’ arguments regarding licensing. To
support their claim that the bills will benefit consumers, advocates predict that legal
protection will enable designers to license their work to low-cost manufacturers, who
will then sell them at affordable prices.105 Again, however, the industry’s own
witnesses undermine this claim by showing that such licensing already occurs.106
While a legal right would give designers more leverage in licensing negotiations (and
may well increase prices for consumers), advocates have yet to make the case that it is
essential. Indeed, licensing to affordable manufacturers could well decrease in a world

See K. Raustiala and C. J. Sprigman, ‘The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in
Fashion Design’ [2006] 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687.
100 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 75 (Statement of Christopher Sprigman).
101 See Hemphill and Suk, supra note 1.
102 See also 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 6 (Statement of Lazaro Hernandez) (noting that “fashion has
grown to a $340 billion industry in the US”).
103 2008 Hearing, supra note 95 at 24 (Statement of Narcisco Rodriguez).
104 See also Raustiala and Sprigman, supra note 99; 2008 Hearing, supra note 95 at 30 (Statement of
Steve Maiman) (“Over many years, the fashion industry has done very well. It has grown into a huge,
competitive, innovative and vibrant industry, all without the help or interference from this particular
type of copyright law.”).
105 E.g., 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 8 (Statement of Lazaro Hernandez) (contending that design
rights will facilitate licensing deals); id. at 14 (Statement of Jeannie Suk).
106 E.g., 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 8 (Statement of Lazaro Hernandez) (describing “American
designers who have collaborated” with low-cost retailers, including “Isaac Mizrahi at Target, Isabel
Toledo at Payless, Norma Kamali at Wal-Mart, Mary Kate and Ashley Olsen at JC Penney, Billy Reid
at J.Crew, Diane von Furstenberg at Gap and Vera Wang at Kohl’s. These stores have all seen the
value of making the works of American designers available in their stores through licensing deals so
that designers get paid for their innovation and creativity”); id. at 14 (Statement of Jeannie Suk)
(“Many extremely talented designers … have partnered with high-volume retailers, such as Target and
HandM, to offer their designs in large numbers at a low price. The ID3PA encourages this kind of
partnership because this allows designers to profit from the creative labor they invest in their original
designs.”).
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of exclusive design rights; it seems plausible that the threat of competition from
copyists may have brought designers to the table in the first place.
Compounding these questions about the incentive effects of design protection are
concerns about its costs.
Deadweight loss and increased consumer prices. As with any form of exclusive rights,
design protection would likely raise the price that consumers pay to access some
appealing designs.107 Of course, the prospect of such supra-competitive pricing comes
with the territory in intellectual property; it generates the profits that give rightsholders reason to invest in creating valuable works. But if creators would innovate
even without the promise of these excess profits, the higher prices cause unnecessary
deadweight loss and a wealth transfer away from consumers.
Definitional problems and the risk of chill. Even if the incentive story indicated a clear
risk of market failure and a need for protection for design, design protection raises
difficult definitional questions that risk chilling legitimate conduct and suppressing
competition. These problems were especially acute in early versions of the design
legislation, which adopted broad definitions of protected subject matter and
infringement.108 Later bills narrowed the right’s subject matter and scope, limiting
protection to “unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and non-utilitarian variation[s]” on
existing designs and defining infringing works as copies that are “substantially
identical” to the “overall visual appearance” of the protected design.109 Despite these
clarifications, experience suggests that determining the validity and scope of design
rights will prove fact-intensive and often indeterminate. The lack of a registration
requirement compounds these notice problems, leaving would-be imitators with three
choices: hiring counsel to evaluate the risk of an infringement suit, plunging forward
and risking litigation, or choosing not to copy.110 Any of these choices raises costs,
which will inevitably pass on to consumers.
If the need for design incentives were sufficiently strong, of course, it could overcome
these objections. In fact, though, the economic record provides meager support for the
fashion industry’s claim that design protection will increase overall social welfare, the
prerequisite for new intellectual property rights in the US. The 2012 bill made it to
the Senate floor despite these shortcomings, but progressed no further. Undoubtedly,
the equivocal economic picture at least partially explains why. Indeed, some Senators
on the Judiciary Committee (where the bill was introduced) opposed it precisely
because of concerns that it could “upset a well-functioning market” and harm

See S. Rep. No. 112-259 at 10 [2012] (Minority Views of Senators Coburn, Cornyn, Lee, and
Sessions).
108 The 2006 legislation would have prohibited the making or importing of any design substantially
similar to an original design. See H.R. 5055, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. [2006]; 17 U.S.C. para 1301
(protecting any original fashion design – defined as.
109 Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, S. 3523, paras 2(a, f) (112th Cong., 2d Sess.).
110 See, e.g., 2008 Hearing, supra note 95 at 32-33 (Statement of Steve Maiman).
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consumers.111 In a separate statement to the Senate Report accompanying the bill,
these Senators noted the “lively debate” over the economics of design protection, and
cautioned that “absent a stronger showing that a practice is systematic and harmful to
the market as a whole, the threat of encroachment on liberty represented by any
congressional enactment tips the balance against government intervention in the
private market.”112
1. Politics, power, and pendulum swings.
The lack of compelling economic support for fashion rights provides a plausible, but
incomplete, picture of why the legislation has repeatedly stalled in Congress. In the
recent past, Congress has often pointed to global norms as justification for expanding
intellectual property rights,113 so one might expect it to follow Europe’s lead in
creating a sui generis regime. And if Congress conditioned new intellectual property
rights on a demonstrated need for incentives, the US intellectual property landscape
would look quite different than it does today.114 Equivocal economic evidence alone,
then, can’t explain the impasse on design. The rest of the story likely owes itself to
some combination of politics and timing.
First, unlike many of the more established “IP industries,” the fashion industry has
neither the economic footprint nor the political clout to command much attention in
Washington.115 Thus, while some sponsors like New York Senator Chuck Schumer
have a sizable constituency that cares about design rights, the design industry plays a
fairly minor role in the national economy and political debate, at least relative to the
collective “content industries” that include music, movie, software, and book
publishers. The existence of major discount retailers with interests on the other side,
moreover, only further weakens the political force behind the drive for fashion
protection.
Second, this latest round of fashion legislation comes at a time of (relative) skepticism
about overly broad intellectual property rights. Congress has, in recent years, worried
over patent trolls and trademark bullies, and scholars have demonstrated that
intellectual property rights can impose substantial costs and hamper innovation
S. Rep. No. 112-259 at 10 [2012].
Id.; see also 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 10 (Statement of Rep. Melvin L. Watt) (recognizing the
“gap” in intellectual property law that allows fashion “knock-offs,” but warning that gaps alone do not
justify new intellectual property rights: “The question is whether this gap is detrimental to intellectual
property rights or whether the existing framework provides all of the protection that is necessary to
meet the Constitutional goal to stimulate and promote innovation within the fashion industry.”).
113 E.g., H. Rep. No. 105-452 at 4 [1998] (“In 1995, the European Union extended the copyright term for
all of its member states from life of the author plus fifty years to life of the author plus seventy years.
As the world leader in the export of intellectual property, this has profound effects for the United States
if it does not extend copyright term as well.”).
114 See supra note 6.
115 See K. Abnett, ‘Money Well Spent? Why Fashion Companies Spend Big on Lobbying Governments’
(Business of Fashion 27 October 2015) <https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/intelligence/moneywell-spent-why-fashion-companies-spend-big-on-lobbying-governments> accessed 24 November 2017
(noting some of the reasons for the fashion industry’s lack of success in lobbying for design legislation).
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rather than inspiring it.116 It is not surprising, then, that the legislative history of the
fashion bills reflects sensitivity to the costs of unnecessary new rights.117
Finally, the long history of failed attempts at sui generis design protection no doubt
played an unstated role in the latest bills’ failure. Fashion designers have complained
about copying for well over a century, and Congress has repeatedly come close to
relenting, but ultimately resisted. Although new technology has sped the pace of
copying, it has not produced any fundamental change in the economic structure of the
fashion industry. Absent some evidence that new conditions raise a heightened risk of
market failure, Congress appears to be staying the course.
III.

Conclusion

Given the fraught history of design legislation in the US, the new popularity of design
patent law, and the different philosophical foundations of intellectual property law in
Europe and the United States, the US may never adopt the “design approach” and
create a Community Design System-like regime. Indeed, unless the popularity of
design patents begins to reverse itself, there may be little push for such a system for
anything other than fashion.
Yet history suggests that the fashion industry, at least, will someday renew its appeal
for industry-specific protection. To some extent, the success of that appeal will depend
on factors such as the political climate and the legislature’s overall level of function (or
dysfunction). But it will also turn on evidence – evidence that fashion design
protection will not only benefit designers, but will improve overall welfare in the US
fashion market. Empirical studies of the price and quality effects of the Community
Design System, for example, could inform the conversation; so could data on licensing
practices in the US compared to Europe. Such evidence might make the case that
design protection fits into the utilitarian architecture of US intellectual property law;
without it, the status quo will likely prevail.

See, e.g., J. Bessen and M. J. Meurer, ‘A Third of the Economy Is At Stake – and Patent Trolls Are to
Blame’ (Wash. Post 18 November 2015), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/intheory/wp/2015/11/18/patent-trolls-are-costing-us-billions-they-must-bestopped/?utm_term=.e08dd01243c7> accessed 24 November 2017.
117 See S. Rep. No. 112-259 at 9 [2012] (Minority Views on 2012 bill) (“We have learned from experience
that legislation has many consequences, some of which can be unintended, unforeseen, and negative.
That same experience reveals a legislative propensity towards expanding rights once created. By
contrast, Congress has been much less successful paring down statutory rights, even where evidence
demonstrates that such rights have become overly-broad.”).
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